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Abstract
There are many different evaluation problems that involve several groups (societies, firms or institutions) whose members
can be classified into ordered categories, pursuant to their characteristics or their achievements. This paper addresses these
types of problems and provides an evaluation criterion based on the distribution of the agents across categories. The
starting point is that of dominance relations in pair-wise comparisons. We say that group i dominates group j when the
expected category of a member of i is higher than the expected category of a member of j. We introduce the notion of
relative advantage of a group to extend this principle to multi-group comparisons and show that there is a unique
evaluation function that ranks all groups consistently in terms of this criterion. This function associates to each evaluation
problem the (unique) dominant eigenvector of a matrix whose entries describe the dominance relations between groups in
pair-wise comparisons. The working of the model is illustrated by means of three different applications.
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Introduction
Judge a man by the reputation of his enemies
(Arabian proverb)
This paper seeks to present a method to evaluate the relative
performance of a given number of groups when the traits or
achievements of their members are described by ordered
categorical data. Groups can refer to population subgroups, state
members of a federation, regions of a country, plants of a firm, etc.
Categories may include age intervals, income brackets, health
statuses, educational achievements, prestige positions, satisfaction
levels, etc. The setting consists, therefore, of a finite set of groups
whose members are classified into a given number of ordered
categories, which summarize their characteristics or their realiza-
tions.
There are two key points in our approach worth stressing. First,
we are concerned with the relative evaluation of the different groups
(i.e. comparing the performance of each group with respect to the
others). This, implicitly, means that groups are not unrelated (e.g.
they can be regarded as subsets of a larger set). Second, we assume
that categories are linearly ordered so that one category can be
unambiguously said to precede, be higher than, or be better than
another. Our goal is to find a suitable measure of relative group
performance taking into account the distribution of group
members along the different categories. The evaluation will focus,
therefore, on the frequency distribution of the agents in the
different cells that arise from the double partition into groups and
categories.
An example, among the many real life situations that fits into
this scheme, is that of a firm willing to assess the comparative
performance of different branches based on the satisfaction levels
reported by their clients (e.g. a hotel chain). The groups here are
the different branches of the firm, and the categories are the
different satisfaction levels, ranging from ‘‘fully satisfied’’ to ‘‘not
satisfied at all’’. The relevant information refers to the distribution
of the clients of each branch by levels of satisfaction.
The evaluation of this type of problem requires a criterion to be
devised that is capable of dealing with qualitative data, which is the
key subject of this paper. Our approach is related to the statistical
analysis regarding the similarity between rank distributions and
the sociological and economic literature on segregation (see [1],
[2], [3], [4], [5]). In these situations, as is also the case with the
Lorenz dominance criterion in the inequality literature, we may
well find that not all groups are comparable and, as a
consequence, that only partial orderings emerge.
We here propose a criterion that allows the relative perfor-
mance of any (finite) number of groups to be evaluated, using
categorical data, in a complete and transitive way. This criterion
can be regarded as an extension of the ideas in [6], in the sense
that the value we attach to a given group is related to the
likelihood of an agent of that group being in a higher position than
an agent of any other one. Such an extension is not trivial as it
requires the direct and indirect relationships between all the groups
involved to be taken into account.
Our evaluation function is presented in a constructive way in
Section 2.1 by means of three steps. First, we define the relative
advantage of group i with respect to group j, as the ratio between
the probability of i dominating j and the sum of the probabilities of
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group i being dominated by other groups. Second, we obtain the
overall advantage of a group as a weighted average of its relative
advantages with respect to all other groups. And third, we select an
invariant weighting system so that the weights used for that
average correspond to those yielded by the overall evaluation
function. The value so obtained is called the worth of a group.
The evaluation so generated corresponds to the eigenvector of a
suitably constructed matrix that incorporates the information on
the distribution of the population in the groups across the different
categories. This solution has a similar flavour to some of the ways
of evaluating the impact of scientific journals (see [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12]), as well as with the score allocation in tournaments
([13], [14], [15], [16]).
Section 2.2 provides three examples that illustrate the way in
which this evaluation procedure works. The first one refers to the
evaluation of Human Capital, in different European countries,
that emerges from the distribution of the educational attainments
of the working age population. The second one uses the results in
the 2013 assessment of cognitive abilities of the adult population,
derived from the OECD’s Program for International Assessment
of Adult Competence survey (PIAAC), in reading literacy. Finally,
we consider the evaluation of health in the former European
Union (EU 15), out of the 2011 Eurostat survey on self-perceived
health status. Those examples show that the evaluation function
can deal with primary data of different nature (subjective or
objective, quantitative or qualitative).
A short discussion closes the paper.
Methods and Results
2.1. Theory
Consider a set of g nonempty groups,G~f1,2,:::,gg, withg§2,
and let ni denote the number of members of group i[G. We
assume that the individual characteristics of the group members
induce a partition in terms of categorical positions
C~fc1,c2,:::,csg, ordered from best to worst, c1]c2]:::]cs.
We denote by nir the number of members of group i in category r.
By definition, ni~
s
r~1 nir,n~
g
i~1 ni: An evaluation problem in this
context refers to the comparison of the relative performance of the
different groups in terms of the distribution of their members in
the different categories.
Let air denote the share of members of group i who belong to
category r, i.e. air = nir/ni, and let pij denote the probability of a member
of group i being in a higher position than a member of group j. Since
categories are ordered, this probability can be easily computed
through the following formula:
pij~ai1 aj2zaj3z ::: zajs
 
zai2 aj3z ::: zajs
 
z ::: zai(s{1)ajs
ð1Þ
Similarly, pji denotes the probability of a representative member
of group j being at a higher position than a representative member
of group i. And, consequently, eij~1{pij{pji stands for the
probability of a member from i, picked at random, being at the
same position as a member from j.
Remark 1: We shall assume, for the sake of simplicity, that all pij are
strictly positive. This point will be discussed later on.
Consider now the following:
Definition 1: We say that group i dominates group j in a pair-wise
comparison when the probability that an individual in group i is at a higher
position than an individual in j is larger than the other way around. That is,
i]jupijwpji.
This is a sound criterion when there are only two groups
involved as it allows their relative performance to be evaluated in
an unambiguous way. This type of pair-wise comparison is
reminiscent of Lieberson’s Index of Net Difference [6]. Extending this
principle to a more general setting, involving any finite number of
groups, requires some additional elaboration, since pair-wise
domination fails to satisfy transitivity. We have to devise a way of
comparing the relative position of members in each group with
respect to all other groups, taking both direct and indirect
relationships into account.
Let P denote the set of all pair-wise comparisons in probability
terms, pij , i=j. This set fully describes the relevant data of our
problem (under the implicit assumption that the size of the groups
is immaterial for the evaluation). We shall refer to P as a reduced
evaluation problem, or simply as a problem. Consider now the following
definitions.
Definition 2: Given a problem P, the relative advantage of group i with
respect to group j, pij(P), is given by:
pij(P)~
pijP
k=i
pki
ð2Þ
That is, the relative advantage of group i with respect to group j,
pij(P), is the ratio between the probability of group i dominating
group j, in a pair-wise comparison, and the sum of the probabilities
of group i being dominated by any other group. For the family of
problems involving only two groups, we have pij(P)~pij=pji, so
that pij(P)w1 indicates that i dominates j. Moreover, we find that,
for all pair-wise comparisons with any given number of groups,
pij(P)=pik(P)~pij=pik: That is, the ratio of the relative advantage
of i with respect to j and with respect to k coincides with the ratio of
their associated domination probabilities. This is not the case in
general, as the probability of being dominated by some other
group changes from one to another.
If pij(P) is the relative advantage of group i with respect to
group j, what can we say about the overall performance of group i ?
The simplest way of achieving such a global evaluation is by
assigning to each group a weighted average of its relative
advantages. That is,
mi~
X
j=i
ljpij(P) ð3Þ
Where ljw0 is a measure of the importance attached to group j
and mi is the resulting overall evaluation of group i. The natural
question is whether we can find an invariant system of weights. That
is, a way of attaching the relevance of the different groups,
l1,:::,l

g
 
, so that: l1,:::,l

g
 
~ m1,:::,mg
 
: This property would
ensure a consistent evaluation, in the sense that the importance
attached to the different groups derives, precisely, from the
importance that the evaluation function yields.
We refer to such a system of weights as the worth vector, and
define the following:
Definition 3: A consistent evaluation function is a mapping F such that,
for each evaluation problem P, it associates its worth to each group. That is, for
any problem P we have F (P)~v, with:
vi~
X
j=i
pij(P)vj ð4Þ
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Note that the worth of a group is higher, all other things being
equal, the higher the worth of the groups it dominates.
The case in which there are only two groups involved has an
interesting property: the ratio between their worth components
coincides with the ratio of the probability of one dominating the
other. That is,
pij
pji
~
vi
vj
~
pij(P)
pji(P)
We next show that such a system of weights always exists and it
is unique, once the scale has been chosen (and bearing in mind
Remark 1). We set the scale so that the average value of the vector
components is equal to 1 in order to facilitate the interpretation.
Theorem 1: Let P be an evaluation problem regardingg§2 groups
whose members are classified into s ordered categories. A unique consistent
evaluation function F exists, with F (P)~vww0,vi~
X
j=i
pij(P)vj ,
and
X
g
i~1
vi~g.
Proof: Consider now that the information relating to problem
P is arranged in the form of a matrix P whose (i,j) entry is pij , for
i=j, and the diagonal elements of that matrix are given by
Di~(g{1){
P
j=i
pji
P~
D1 p12 ::: p1g
p21 D2 ::: p2g
::: ::: ::: :::
pg1 pg2 ::: Dg
0
BBB@
1
CCCA ð5Þ
Matrix P* is simply a particular way of arranging the
information concerning the problem under consideration. Now
observe that P* is a square matrix with positive entries (i.e. a
Perron matrix). Moreover, by construction, all columns of P* add
up to (g{1). Therefore, P* has a unique dominant positive
eigenvalue, equal to (g{1), that has associated a strictly positive
eigenvector vww0, with:
Pv~(g{1)v ð6Þ
This eigenvector, v~ v1, v2,:::, vg
 
, is unique up to a scalar
multiplication, so that we can assume, without loss of generality,
that v1zv2z:::zvg~g. Observe that the ith entry of that
eigenvector can be written as:
vi~
X
j=1
X pijvj
j=i pji
ð7Þ
The evaluation function is thus implicitly defined as follows:
F (P)~ v[Rgzz = P
v~(g{1)v,
X
g
i~1
vi~g
 
and we obtain the desired result. Q.e.d.
Theorem 1 tells us that there is a unique consistent evaluation
function F that attaches its worth to each group. The worth of a
group refers to the situation of a representative member vis a vis the
representative members of all other groups. Function F allows the
relative advantage of any two groups to be consistently compared:
viwvj means that the members of i are, on average, in a better
position than the members of j. The components of the worth
vector can be interpreted as the limit procedure of the following
contest: Take two groups at random, select one individual within
each group, and compare them. The group to which the
individual with a higher category belongs is selected to keep
running the contest and a new individual of this group is randomly
selected. This individual will be confronted with another one,
selected at random from other group, also chosen at random. We
then apply the same principle as before regarding the group that is
selected for the next round. The components of the worth vector
turn out to be proportional to the length of time that each group is
kept competing, when we repeat this process indefinitely.
Computing the worth of the different groups is straightforward,
as they correspond to the Perron eigenvector of matrix P*. That
feature also permits the worth vector to be interpreted as the limit
of a dynamic evaluation process in which the value attached to a
group is sequentially adjusted by using matrix P*, starting from
any arbitrary evaluation of the different groups. That is, let us take
an initial evaluation vector, v (e.g, vi~1 so that the initial
evaluation of a group corresponds to the arithmetic mean of its
relative advantages), and proceed as follows:
v(1)~Pv,v(2)~Pv(1), :::,v(t)~Pv(t{1), ::: We thus obtain:
v~limt??v
(t).
Remark 2: We have devised a free access and friendly algorithm to
compute the worth vector out of the matrix of relative frequencies, which
can be directly operated from data in the format of an Excel spreadsheet. The
algorithm first constructs the P* matrix (as an internal operation) and then
computes the worth vector, suitably normalized. See http://www.ivie.es/
valoracion/index.php.
2.2. The Working of the Worth Vector: Three Examples
This section is devoted to illustrating how the worth vector
works in three different scenarios that involve qualitative and
quantitative characteristics as well as subjective and objective data.
The first example refers to the composition of Human Capital in
different European countries, taken to be the distribution of the
working population across educational attainments. Information is
here objective and characteristics are purely qualitative. The
second illustration refers to the evaluation of cognitive abilities of
adult population in some OECD countries, using the data of the
2013 PIAAC with respect to reading literacy. We also find here a
case with objective information but, contrary to the first example,
the characteristics are defined by intervals of quantitative data.
Finally, we provide a comparative evaluation of the perceived
health situation of the EU15 countries, taken from the Self-
reported Health Status Survey. In this case, inputs are subjective
perceptions and categories are purely ordinal. In all three
examples, the worth vector provides a complete ranking of the
respective countries, according to their relative performance or
achievements. As this exercise is merely for illustrative purposes,
we shall not delve into the nature of the resulting differences. Yet,
in the second and third examples, we provide alternative
evaluations in order to enable the outcome of this procedure to
be compared.
2.2.1. Comparing the quality of human capital in
europe. Human Capital is one of the key determinants of
human development and long-term economic growth (see for
instance [17] and the references provided there). Countries display
a wide variety of educational structures, regarding the qualification
of their labour forces, even in relatively homogenous environ-
ments, as the 2010 Eurostat data show. Such diversity highlights
the difficulty of attaining an overall comparative measure of
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Human Capital. Our model can be fruitfully applied to this
context, in order to obtain a sensible evaluation of the relative
quality of Human Capital under the assumption that higher levels
of education are preferable.
We compare here the composition of Human Capital in Europe
in 2010, in terms of the distribution of the population aged
between 25 and 64 years old across the different educational levels,
as defined by the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED). We compare the relative educational
achievements of 30 European countries using Eurostat data.
Table 1 below describes, in its first three columns, the distribution
of the population of the different countries at three educational
levels: primary studies (ISCED 0–2), secondary studies (ISCED 3–
4), and tertiary studies (ISCED 5–6). The table shows the wide
diversity in the Human Capital structure mentioned above.
Roughly speaking, Europe presents, on average, a distribution
where one half of the adult population has secondary studies,
whereas one quarter has primary studies and the remaining
quarter tertiary studies. The extreme values for tertiary studies
correspond to Finland (37.6%) and, somewhat unexpectedly, to
Italy (14.8%). The extreme values for primary studies correspond
to Lithuania (8%) and Malta (70.3%). Secondary studies range
between 75.2% (Czech Republic) and 16.5% (Portugal). The
corresponding coefficients of variation are 0.3 for tertiary studies,
0.3 for secondary studies and 0.6 for primary studies.
The last column of Table 1 provides the evaluation of the
relative quality of Human Capital in those countries according to
our evaluation formula (the normalized eigenvector of the
associated P* matrix). The worth vector shows that Lithuania,
Estonia, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
are the countries with relatively better Human Capital structure,
whereas Malta, Portugal, Italy, Romania, Spain and Greece are at
the other end of the quality distribution. The coefficient of
variation of the worth vector takes on the value 0.35, which is
rather large.
2.2.2. Assessment of cognitive abilities from the
PIAAC. The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult
Competences (PIAAC), coordinated by the OECD, is a new database
on the cognitive skills of the population between 16 and 65 years
old. It provides information on the abilities that people actually
have rather than on their formal education. It is, therefore, a
valuable complement of the studies carried out on the levels of
competence of young people in different fields and for different
ages (e.g. the Program for International Students Assessment,
PISA). The PIAAC provides cross-section data on the skills of the
adult population in the areas of reading literacy and mathematics.
Twenty-three countries participated in this first wave and a few
more will be incorporated in an extension planned for the
following three years. The skills assessment is performed using
questionnaires and the valuations are measured on a scale of 0–
500 points.
PIAAC defines six levels of competence, parameterized by
certain thresholds of the test scores (see Table 2). Note that setting
of the levels is essentially a qualitative exercise (i.e. the levels are
defined in terms of the tasks that individuals are able to perform)
even though the resulting categories are made operational through
a convenient parameterization.
Table 3 presents a comparison between the (normalized) worth
vector and the mean values. Focusing on the worth vector, we
observe that the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway are the
European countries well above the mean worth (with Japan, the
top country by far). At the end of the ranking, we find Poland,
Ireland, France, Spain and Italy, with values between 80% and
46% of the mean worth.
The most striking feature of previous comparisons is the huge
difference in their variability. The coefficient o variation of the
worth vector is more than nine times that of mean scores, in spite
of the high correlation between both vectors (around 0.88).
Table 1. Shares of the population by levels of study and
worth vector.
Countries Primary Secondary Tertiary Worth vector
Austria 0.1623 0.6448 0.1929 0.869
Belgium 0.2950 0.3551 0.3499 0.979
Bulgaria 0.2077 0.5608 0.2315 0.871
Cyprus 0.2501 0.3940 0.3558 1.095
Czech Republic 0.0806 0.7518 0.1677 0.986
Denmark 0.2212 0.4367 0.3421 1.130
Estonia 0.1088 0.5382 0.3529 1.530
Finland 0.1697 0.4548 0.3755 1.388
France 0.2916 0.4173 0.2912 0.850
Germany 0.1371 0.5982 0.2647 1.126
Greece 0.3481 0.4128 0.2391 0.657
Hungary 0.1871 0.6117 0.2012 0.839
Iceland 0.2777 0.3969 0.3254 0.956
Ireland 0.2611 0.3658 0.3730 1.115
Italy 0.4426 0.4094 0.1480 0.409
Latvia 0.1153 0.6159 0.2689 1.203
Lithuania 0.0798 0.5938 0.3264 1.542
Luxemburg 0.1751 0.4713 0.3537 1.296
Malta 0.7028 0.1591 0.1381 0.222
Netherlands 0.2703 0.4046 0.3251 0.970
Norway 0.1899 0.4461 0.3640 1.284
Poland 0.1134 0.6580 0.2286 1.081
Portugal 0.6808 0.1647 0.1545 0.250
Romania 0.2571 0.6050 0.1380 0.594
Slovakia 0.0904 0.7364 0.1732 0.978
Slovenia 0.1669 0.5959 0.2372 0.973
Spain 0.4689 0.2251 0.3060 0.619
Sweden 0.1351 0.5230 0.3418 1.388
Switzerland 0.1244 0.5250 0.3506 1.460
United Kingdom 0.1487 0.5097 0.3416 1.341
UE-27 0.2579 0.4844 0.2577
Source: Eurostat.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084784.t001
Table 2. Thresholds of the tests scores.
Reading literacy Range of score points
Level 5 .375
Level 4 326–375
Level 3 276–325
Level 2 226–275
Level 1 176–225
Level ,1 ,176
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084784.t002
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Moreover, there are some changes in the ranking between both
evaluations, even though they are not many.
2.2.3. Perceived health in the EU 15. We now present an
application of the model to the 2011 health comparison of
European countries. The data, provided by Eurostat, involve
fifteen countries (the EU15) and are from a survey in which people
report their perceived state of health, selecting one of the five
possible states: Very good, Good, Fair, Bad, and Very bad.
In order to evaluate the health level of a society using those data
and to compare the situation of different countries, analysts are
bound to attach some cardinal values to those health categories,
either by a naive procedure (a ‘‘1 to 5’’ scale) or by means of more
sophisticated methods ([18], [19], [20]). Be that as it may, the
results so obtained depend on the chosen cardinalization, whose
rationale is not always clear. Indeed, several authors have
proposed ways out of that difficulty. In [21] apply a family of
inequality indices due to [22] that have suitable invariant
properties with respect to the cardinalization. [23] deals with the
same problem from a different perspective, using socioeconomic
variables to order distributions (Lorenz dominance criteria applied
on an income-health matrix).
Our model provides an endogenous cardinalization that stems
from the distribution of the population between the different
health states, without having to decide how much ‘‘good health’’ is
better than ‘‘bad health’’, and so on. Table 4 below describes the
distribution of the population between the different states and the
evaluation obtained through the worth vector. We have also
included the evaluation according to the ‘‘1 to 5’’ scale (normalised
as before) in order to obtain a comparative view of the worth
vector. This scale gives one point to the ‘‘Very bad’’ health status,
two points to the ‘‘Bad’’ state, etc., up to five points to the ‘‘Very
good’’ state.
The top performers according to the worth vector are Ireland,
Greece and Sweden, with values above 40% of the mean worth.
At the other extreme we find Germany, Italy and Portugal, with
values well below 70% of the mean worth.
Both evaluations show a salient feature: health perceptions are
widely different among the citizens of the European Countries,
with no correlation whatsoever between self-assessed health and a
standard measure of health such as life expectancy at birth (the
coefficient of correlation is just 0.0161 for the worth vector and
0.076 for the ‘‘1 to 5’’ evaluation). Note that, even though both
procedures yield very similar rankings (and also show a high level
of linear correlation, with a coefficient of 0.95), the worth vector
discriminates much more between countries. The coefficient of
variation of the worth vector is 0.378, almost seven times that of
the other evaluation (with a CV of 0.056).
Discussion
There are many different evaluation problems that involve
several groups (societies or institutions) whose members can be
classified into ordered categories, pursuant to their characteristics
or their achievements. The solution proposed here exploits the
information on the distribution of agents across categories in order
to provide an estimate of their relative situation. The comparison
criterion that lies behind our evaluation method corresponds to
the likelihood of an agent in a given group belonging to a higher
category than another agent picked at random in any other group.
Table 3. Distribution of the population by levels of competence and normalized scores and worth vector for reading literacy
(2012).
National entities Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 Level ,1 Worth vector Mean scores
Australia 0.0133 0.1600 0.4013 0.2972 0.0961 0.0316 1.262 1.022
Austria 0.0027 0.0830 0.3798 0.3786 0.1307 0.0255 0.849 0.983
Canada 0.0095 0.1291 0.3763 0.3200 0.1268 0.0383 1.004 1.004
Czech Republic 0.0040 0.0831 0.4174 0.3774 0.1033 0.0151 0.976 1.008
Denmark 0.0038 0.0967 0.4010 0.3411 0.1194 0.0382 0.930 0.998
England (UK) 0.0078 0.1259 0.3646 0.3358 0.1326 0.0335 0.964 0.998
Estonia 0.0077 0.1101 0.4076 0.3441 0.1105 0.0201 1.050 1.017
Finland 0.0076 0.1097 0.4060 0.3427 0.1100 0.0200 1.050 1.062
France 0.0029 0.0748 0.3434 0.3620 0.1638 0.0535 0.699 0.963
Germany 0.0049 0.1032 0.3698 0.3445 0.1446 0.0335 0.874 0.987
Ireland 0.0039 0.0815 0.3621 0.3775 0.1322 0.0432 0.791 0.982
Italy 0.0006 0.0329 0.2654 0.4229 0.2232 0.0554 0.458 0.921
Japan 0.0120 0.2163 0.4915 0.2305 0.0436 0.0061 2.167 1.085
Korea 0.0022 0.0792 0.4184 0.3715 0.1067 0.0221 0.941 1.005
Netherlands 0.0134 0.1722 0.4242 0.2703 0.0932 0.0266 1.402 1.033
Norway 0.0062 0.1338 0.4256 0.3086 0.0949 0.0307 1.182 1.013
Poland 0.0066 0.0900 0.3503 0.3654 0.1483 0.0390 0.795 0.986
Slovak Republic 0.0015 0.0732 0.4455 0.3634 0.0977 0.0191 0.990 1.010
Spain 0.0015 0.0466 0.2805 0.3946 0.2044 0.0726 0.502 0.926
Sweden 0.0120 0.1488 0.4157 0.2908 0.0958 0.0370 1.232 1.032
United States 0.0066 0.1136 0.3572 0.3398 0.1416 0.0407 0.883 0.968
Source: OECD (PIAAC survey).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084784.t003
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Our contribution consists of framing the evaluation problem in
such a way that the solution to the evaluation corresponds to the
dominant eigenvector of a Perron matrix. As a consequence, the
solution obtained (the worth vector) exhibits simple, useful and well-
known properties: existence, uniqueness, positiveness, stability,
easy calculation and regular behaviour regarding changes in the
parameters.
The worth vector not only provides a complete ranking of any
given number of groups, but also an endogenous cardinalization
that allows a quantitative estimate of their differences. Those
features derive from the design of the evaluation formula, which
processes the information on all pair-wise dominance probabilities
in an integrated way. Interestingly enough, the ranking so
obtained agrees with the partial ordering generated by stochastic
dominance relationships, as in [22] or [23].
The uniqueness and strict positiveness of the worth vector in
Theorem 1 is ensured by the assumption pijw0, for all i,j. Indeed,
this same result can be guaranteed by merely assuming a much
weaker condition, namely, the irreducibility of matrix P*. That is,
assuming that there is no partition of the set of groups G into two
disjoint subsets, G1,G2, so that pji~0, for all i[G1, j[G2: If such a
partition exists, i.e., if matrix P* is reducible, it simply means that
any group in G1 fully dominates any group in G2: In that case, the
valuation vector associated to the dominated groups (those in G2)
could be zero, and we can only guarantee the strict positiveness for
the valuation of groups in G1: The extreme case of this situation
appears when there is a single group dominated by all other
groups. In such a case, the dominated group can be regarded as a
dummy, in the sense that its worth is zero and, moreover, the
relative valuation of the remaining groups does not change when
we remove the unanimously dominated group. If matrix P* is
reducible, then groups in G1 and in G2 belong to ‘‘different
classes’’ and comparing the relative performance within each class
is what makes sense. In a similar vein, in [14] only tournament
matrices that are irreducible are considered, interpreting that the
reducibility of matrices implies a division in different equivalence
classes and it is only meaningful to compare elements within the
same class.
It is also interesting to point out that the evaluation function in
Theorem 1 satisfies a number of standard properties that reinforce
its operational and normative appeal. We mention here: (i)
Anonymity: the evaluation only depends on the characteristics of the
groups and not on other aspects such as labels or names; (ii)
Symmetry: when pij~pji, for all pairs of groups, i, j, then all groups
are given identical values; (iii) Monotonicity: when some members of
a group shift to a higher category, with everything else unchanged,
then the evaluation of this group increases; (iv) Stochastic dominance:
when one group stochastically dominates another one, then, it
obtains a higher evaluation (in [22] we find a partial ordering
based on this criterion robust to changes in the cardinalization); (v)
Reciprocity: for those problems involving two groups the relative
valuation of the groups coincides with the ratio of the
corresponding domination probabilities (see also [14]); and (vi)
Group replication invariance: the evaluation of the groups depends on
the shares of their agents in the different categories but not on the
size of those groups.
Note that the worth vector, as any eigenvector, has a degree of
freedom, which allows the scale to be fixed at will. We have here
chosen a normalization such that the mean value of the worth
vector is equal to one. We can thus easily identify the groups that
are above or below the mean.
The examples in Section 2.2 show that the procedure can be
applied to different types of problems, involving quantitative or
qualitative data of an objective or subjective nature. When data
are ordinal (examples 2.2.1 and 2.2.3) categories are defined in
terms of some property on which there is usually a wide consensus.
When data are cardinal (example 2.2.2) the building of the
categories usually requires parameterizing some property in terms
of the range of values of the outcome variables (as with the levels of
competence in the PIAAC study). It is important in that case to
avoid the arbitrariness of the categories to ensure the relevance of
the evaluation.
Table 4. Distribution of the population within EU 15 by health states in 2011.
Countries Very good Good Fair Bad Very bad Worth vector ‘‘1 to 5’’ scale
Austria 0.312 0.382 0.215 0.072 0.019 0.975 1.004
Belgium 0.296 0.439 0.169 0.074 0.021 1.016 1.008
Denmark 0.280 0.428 0.209 0.058 0.025 0.940 0.999
Finland 0.216 0.473 0.237 0.063 0.012 0.796 0.984
France 0.226 0.450 0.236 0.076 0.012 0.788 0.979
Germany 0.166 0.482 0.270 0.066 0.015 0.659 0.957
Greece 0.506 0.258 0.146 0.063 0.027 1.660 1.070
Ireland 0.425 0.401 0.145 0.025 0.005 1.707 1.087
Italy 0.131 0.516 0.222 0.102 0.030 0.580 0.932
Luxembourg 0.260 0.465 0.196 0.064 0.015 0.935 1.002
Netherlands 0.211 0.552 0.179 0.049 0.008 0.923 1.006
Portugal 0.094 0.403 0.322 0.131 0.049 0.389 0.865
Spain 0.215 0.536 0.174 0.055 0.020 0.893 0.997
Sweden 0.385 0.414 0.154 0.037 0.010 1.453 1.063
UnitedKingdom 0.355 0.420 0.168 0.047 0.010 1.286 1.047
Worth vector and evaluation with ‘‘1 to 5’’ scale (mean = 1 in both cases).
Source: Eurostat.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084784.t004
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The examples in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 include an alternative
evaluation of the problem under consideration. This is done in
order to better illustrate the nature of the worth vector. By using a
common scale we can compare individual values and likewise the
spread of the resulting evaluations. We have found a high
correlation between both types of evaluation in the two examples,
even though there may be some changes in the ranking. Yet the
worth vector discriminates much more (the coefficient of variation
is much larger). The reason is that those alternative evaluations are
obtained for each group independently of the rest (absolute
evaluation of individual groups). The worth vector, on the
contrary, requires computing the domination relationships of each
group with respect to all others. The worth of a group, therefore,
depends not only on the distribution of its members on the
different categories, but also on the distribution of the agents of all
other groups.
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